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In recent years, protracted crises and fragile post-conflict settings have challenged the co-existence, 
and even the linear continuum, of relief and development aid. Forced migration has tested humani-
tarian and development paradigms where sudden-onset emergencies, violence and displacement 
arise alongside ongoing development work. Drawing on Médecins Sans Frontières interventions 
in the region from December 2010 to May 2011, this paper examines aid and healthcare responses 
to displacement in Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia; it focuses on challenges to the maintenance of pre-
paredness for such foreseeable emergencies and to adaptation in response to changing situations 
of displacement and insecurity. This ‘backsliding’ from development to emergency remains a 
substantial challenge to aid; yet, in exactly such cases, it also presents the opportunity to ensure 
access to medical care that is much more urgently needed in times of crisis, including the suspension 
of user fees for medical care. 
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Introduction
In recent years, protracted crises and fragile post-conflict settings have challenged the 
notion that conflict, the post-conflict phase and stability exist on a linear continuum, 
just as they have blurred the boundary between relief and development. Much has 
already been written about the fragility of post-conflict countries, the high potential 
of return to conflict and the challenges of delivering aid in such rapidly evolving 
contexts, including in Liberia (Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom, 2006; Gariba, 2011; 
Kruk et al., 2010; Rincon, 2010). In such settings, forced migration may test humani-
tarian and development paradigms as sudden-onset emergencies, violence and dis-
placement arise alongside ongoing development work (Derderian and Schockaert, 
2010; Levine, 2011; Van Damme, Van Lerberghe and Boelaert, 2002). Recent devel-
opments in Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia are a case in point.1
 The November 2010 run-off elections, the ensuing political crisis and violent 
clashes in Côte d’Ivoire produced internal displacement as well as successive waves 
of refugees fleeing to neighbouring countries. One of the epicentres of violence and 
displacement was in western Côte d’Ivoire, along the border with Liberia, where 
Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) had previously documented violence (MSF, 2007b). 
In 2010–11, an estimated 500,000 people were displaced within Côte d’Ivoire and 
188,000 refugees fled to Liberia. 
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 The presence of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees in open settings—
in villages or the bush in Côte d’Ivoire and among host communities in Liberia—
challenged emergency interventions that centred on camps and towns, even as 
populations outside these sites became more vulnerable, facing continued violence 
or declining resources. 
 Practitioners and researchers have now recognised that the debate around access to 
health care is inseparable from humanitarian aid responses in countries straddling 
emergency and recovery. In contexts such as Côte d’Ivoire, vulnerable populations 
can encounter barriers to accessing health care even during stable periods—with 
renewed crises affecting health services, exacerbating ongoing needs and, conse-
quently, aggravating the lack of access to medical care. During the recent emer-
gency, the Ivorian government decreed a temporary suspension of user fees for health 
care, renewing debate about access to health care and user fees, long a concern in 
this context.
 In assessing aid and health care responses to displacement in Côte d’Ivoire and 
Liberia, this paper draws on MSF interventions in the region from December 2010 to 
May 2011.2 It examines challenges facing aid agencies as they attempt to maintain 
preparedness for such foreseeable emergencies3 and as they adapt operational and 
advocacy approaches to respond to changing situations of displacement and insecu-
rity (MSF, 2009a). Humanitarian actors struggle to ensure access to urgently needed 
health care by providing necessary staff, drugs and materials, while also addressing 
geographical and financial obstacles. ‘Backsliding’ from development to emergency 
remains a substantial challenge to aid; yet, in exactly such cases, this dynamic pre-
sents the opportunity to ensure access to medical care that is much more urgently 
needed in times of crisis, including through the suspension of user fees for medical care.
Liberia and the refugee response
Background
Remote Nimba county in north-eastern Liberia received several influxes of refugees 
from Côte d’Ivoire. The first eight weeks after the electoral crisis of November 2010 
saw nearly 40,000 ‘pre-emptive’ Ivorian arrivals. Larger-scale population movements 
followed, from February to March 2011, as the northern forces led a military offen-
sive westward, towards Abidjan; the influxes continued beyond incumbent president 
Laurent Gbagbo’s arrest on 10 April 2011.
 Many of the refugees told MSF they had suffered violence, often repeated displace-
ment, kidnapping and rape (MSF, 2011). As of the end of May 2011, MSF projects 
no longer registered any new violent trauma cases. Still, MSF teams continued to 
see numerous infections and infected wounds on both sides of the border, largely 
because the displaced lacked access to medical facilities, as few were operational, 
although some also sought treatment after having resorted to traditional medicine, 
which occasionally proved fatal. In its mobile medical activities along the border, 
MSF also observed a high level of consultations for generalised body pain—16% in 
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April 2011 (732/4,489 consultations)—suggesting not only the difficult living con-
ditions of displaced people sheltered in host families and working their fields, but 
also suggesting a possible high level of mental health stress in a precarious situation.
 The majority of the estimated 93,000 refugees in Nimba county4 chose to remain 
in villages along the border for several reasons: 
• kinship relations with local communities and a strong tradition of mutual hosting 
during wars in each country; 
• the desire to stay near their property and homes in Côte d’Ivoire as well as the 
possibility of farming in locations closer to the border; and 
• a reluctance to enter Bahn camp, at a significant distance from the border, itself a 
scene of violence during prior wars. 
 The slow-onset arrival of refugees in remote areas initially received little attention, 
but the presence of often-moving refugees in open settings along the border even-
tually posed several challenges for all those involved in the refugee response.
 At both the national and international levels, outright war in neighbouring Côte 
d’Ivoire and refugee influxes, along with the possible movement of combatants, were 
seen as a threat to the ongoing stabilisation efforts of the long-term UN Mission in 
Liberia and to the country’s internal security (HRW, 2012).5 Reaching refugees in 
villages scattered along the border represented a significant logistical challenge; the 
region’s scarce basic services and generally low national health indicators6 raised legiti-
mate fears that shared resources could be depleted, affecting both refugee populations 
and their hosts. Yet immediate emergency responses stalled as they were viewed as 
‘disrupting’ ongoing development work and as politically sensitive in an election year.
 When the initial refugee flows arrived in northern and eastern Liberia, the coun-
try’s health care system was still recovering from massive looting and destruction 
during the 14-year civil war, which lasted from 1997 to 2003. The war left the over-
whelming majority of public health facilities non-functional, with the remaining 
structures dependent on support from non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and 
the population still seriously affected by conflict, displacement and extreme poverty 
(Msuya and Sondorp, 2005). In 2007, the national health plan outlined a basic package 
of health services to be provided free of charge, with international donors financ-
ing 80% of national health spending (Kruk et al., 2010). At the time, the Liberian 
government noted that 300 of the 389 functional health facilities in the country were 
supported by NGOs, yet assistance from 40% of the NGOs was slated to end by mid-
2008 (Government of Liberia, 2007a). The government also estimated that the 
country had a health workforce ratio of 0.18/100,000, with health services covering 
an estimated 41% of the population (CDC, 2008, p. 28). 
 This precariousness characterised health care in Nimba county as well as through-
out much of the rest of Liberia. An informal MSF survey of 50 known health 
structures in Nimba county in 2007—3 hospitals, 6 health centres and 41 clinics—
finds that 30 were operated by NGOs, 9 by faith-based organisations or missions, 
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6 by the government, 4 by private entities and one by the community. An internal 
review of 43 of 49 existing health structures in Nimba county in 2008—36 clinics, 
3 health centres and 4 hospitals—finds that:
• Residents lived on average 7 km from the nearest health structure, with almost 
60% of the population living within a 2-hour walk of a health facility. At the 
same time, poor roads and a lack of transportation meant that some 70% of women 
cited geographical distance as a major barrier to accessing health care.
• While all health facilities surveyed had at least one trained health worker—usually a 
nurse—and 70–86% had some basic infrastructure or equipment, fewer than half 
of the facilities surveyed had all five of the basic inputs studied, namely staff, elec-
tricity, water, stethoscopes and a refrigerator.
• Availability of different health services remained very heterogeneous, with poor 
child and maternal health evidenced by high rates of infant and under-five mor-
tality, measured at 72/1,000 and 111/1,000, respectively, in 2002–07 (LISGIS, 
MOH and NACP, 2007). To ensure access to care, availability of services would 
need to be complemented by factors such as affordability, acceptability, appropri-
ateness and quality of care (Kruk et al., 2010).
 As of 2012, much vulnerability remained, with Liberians effectively facing a sub-
stantial out-of-pocket burden for health expenses despite the package of free basic 
services (Downie, 2012). 
 Still, free health care in Liberia frequently led Ivorians to cross the border to seek 
affordable care in Nimba county—a trend that only intensified during the emergency 
and persisted in its aftermath. A local NGO reported to MSF that Ivorians regularly 
represented 20% of consultations in the Butuuo health centre, even before the crisis, 
and at least 25–30% of consultations during and after the crisis, up to December 2011.
The refugee response in 2011 
As the Ivorian refugees first arrived, national and international programmes in Liberia 
were promoting a gradual, systematic transition; these efforts confronted a ‘transi-
tion gap’ between relief and development as well as multiple challenges linked to the 
provision of basic services such as health, education and food security (Government 
of Liberia, 2007b). A state-building approach prevailed, with an emphasis on aligning 
development aid with government priorities and on taking a whole-of-government 
approach that would link political, security and development objectives although 
the continued fragility of the peace was widely recognised (OECD, 2011). 
 Accordingly, the UN began to draw down its aid agencies in Liberia, including the 
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).7 As a result, little emergency 
response capacity was available in the country. While a refugee response may take some 
time to be launched, initial time was lost due to a lack of clarity regarding whether 
UNHCR would take the lead in what might become a classic refugee situation or 
whether a UN system-wide approach would coordinate the refugee response through 
the established cluster mechanism. 
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 In mid-January 2011, UNHCR teamed up with the Liberian government and 
developed an initial strategy that provided assistance to refugees in Bahn camp and 
15 identified host communities at distances of 15 or more kilometres from the border.8 
Fifteen of these 16 locations, including Bahn refugee camp, were in the Gio and 
Yacouba tribal areas—in northern Liberia—while only one site was located in a Krahn 
and Guéré area; this approach left few options for refugees of the Guéré group. 
 As of March 2011, UNHCR and NGO joint contingency planning foresaw the 
movement of 70% of the refugee caseload to camps, citing the specific strategic 
objective of ‘swiftly mov[ing] refugees away from the border for security and logistical 
reasons (as per the principles of the 1969 OAU convention)’—while simultaneously 
intending the process to meet ‘to the greatest extent possible the beneficiaries’ expec-
tations and their voluntary choice’ (UNHCR, 2011c). Yet between the camp’s open-
ing in mid-February 2011 and mid-May 2011, no more than 5,000 of more than 
90,000 refugees counted in Nimba ever moved to Bahn camp, while no more than 
2,000 sought shelter in relocation villages. 
 As a result, the majority of the refugees remained along the border area in host 
communities, where no systematic international assistance was provided. Support 
from host families, one-off distributions and the presence of some international 
NGOs was the rule. In addition, UNHCR’s policy was repeatedly revised and 
redrafted throughout the influx—but never finalised. The lack of a clear, finalised 
policy on UN and NGO assistance for the majority of the refugees in the border areas 
kept humanitarian actors from launching programmes and providing more exten-
sive assistance there, in addition to the camps.9 National and international actors 
encapsulated the resulting policy with the phrase ‘no aid but international protec-
tion’ in the border areas.
 Yet international protection activities remained minimal, with no international 
UNHCR staff based at the border. In mid-May, the establishment of referral pro-
cedures for sexual violence cases in the region had only just begun, while monitoring 
tools for protection were still in their initial stages. As of May 2011, the sole person-
nel working on a regular basis at the border were 32 monitors from the Liberian 
Refugee Repatriation and Resettlement Committee (a government ministry) and 
135 national staff hired by an international NGO and posted along the border to 
inform refugees of their rights.10 Yet both actors adopted an explicit policy of 
‘encouraging’ refugees to leave the border for the camps or relocation villages or 
pointing to the greater availability of material assistance in the camp,11 raising ques-
tions about the voluntary nature of the choice to move.
 As of mid-May 2011, UNHCR was redrafting a policy for assistance at the border, 
but it was still not finalised as of June 2011, more than six months after the refugee 
influx had begun.12 The upshot was a situation in which—after exposure to violence 
and displacement—Ivorian refugees were again subjected to a difficult choice: they 
could either stay at the border to share resources with local communities but receive 
little outside aid or protection, or they could move to a camp or relocation village and 
receive assistance, but leave family, hosts, fields and a perception of security behind. 
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Refugees and the provision of health care
Not only did a timely response to the refugee arrivals fail to materialise, but ongoing 
development work on health care in Liberia also slowed the provision of health 
services to refugees. The Nimba county health team worked in collaboration with 
two NGOs—one national, one international—to provide medical care in the region. 
In January 2011, county-level health authorities, UNHCR and some NGOs expressed 
a preference for more ‘sustainable’ projects than mobile clinics in border areas host-
ing refugees; in addition, concern was expressed about the duplication of efforts 
and the possibility that patients might abandon established health structures in favour 
of mobile clinics. This debate reflected the messy continuum between primary health 
care and emergency medical assistance.
 While primary health care adopts a long-term, sustainable approach towards opti-
mising health as a condition for development, emergency medical assistance aims for 
health as an objective in itself, with a short-term and needs-based approach designed 
to ensure physical survival in urgent situations. Indeed, ‘many real life situations are 
somewhere in-between’, including refugee influxes that overwhelm pre-existing 
facilities, while free-of-charge humanitarian services also emerge around refugees 
(Van Damme, Van Lerberghe and Boelaert, 2002). During the refugee influx, the 
Liberian Ministry of Health maintained its ongoing work in partnership with NGOs 
in referral hospitals and health centres serving the local population. Meanwhile, 
humanitarian actors such as MSF responded to gaps in the country’s health system, 
which was inaccessible for a significant number of refugees or no longer able to 
respond fully to increasing demand.
 In Nimba county, health structures were overwhelmed soon after the refugee 
influx, with the two development NGOs already present in the region reporting 
that refugees accounted for 50% of their consultations by the end of January 2011. 
Medical staff, drug supplies, surgical capacity and ambulances were scarce and often 
undependable in the region at the outset of the refugee influx. In late February, the 
local authorities and international actors agreed that MSF and another NGO could 
provide mobile health care where no other health facility was available within one 
hour’s walk—but UNHCR funding would not support any health care outside the 
camp and the relocation villages. In these locations, health-related activities in the 
refugee response were still restricted to refugee households and not readily made 
available to host communities. These included both an emergency ambulance ser-
vice and—flying in the face of public health logic—spraying for mosquitoes only in 
refugee houses in shared relocation villages.
 Fortunately, no major health or other crisis resulted from the slow response to the 
refugee arrivals. Yet the experience of 2011 poses questions about the capacity and 
the will of aid actors and the wider aid system to change tracks to respond to sudden 
forced displacement—in particular while stabilisation and development work is 
ongoing. Beyond Liberia, these questions will remain vital ones not only for UNHCR 
as a mandated refugee organisation, but also for UN missions, donors, humanitarian 
and development NGOs and national or local authorities, whenever they face sudden-
onset emergencies in contexts of stabilisation or development.
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 Considering the historical volatility of the entire region, a ‘watch and wait’ approach 
may have predominated among aid actors in the interest of ongoing projects in Liberia 
as well as in Côte d’Ivoire. Refugee responses may take some time to launch and a 
situation of refugees or IDPs in open, remote settings with difficult access under-
standably presents a challenge to aid delivery. Still, international mandates to provide 
urgently needed humanitarian assistance and to protect refugees are clear and debates 
on assistance in such settings are long-standing and well known. In the absence of 
dependable assistance, MSF found that refugees regularly crossed the border back 
into Côte d’Ivoire—at personal risk—to retrieve food or seeds from their abandoned 
houses or to search for lost relatives. 
 A similar absence of emergency response characterised the response on the Côte 
d’Ivoire side, raising parallel debates about the ability of the aid system to change 
tracks to meet health and humanitarian needs in view of forced displacement in a 
context where much has been invested in stabilisation and development.
Côte d’Ivoire and the response in the west
Emergency response in Côte d’Ivoire
Two main waves of internal displacement took place in the Ivorian west, first in 
response to the offensive of northern forces on the economic capital, Abidjan, in 
March 2011 and then in mid-April. Most of those fleeing the border area left for 
Liberia or remained in villages, campements (shelters located next to outlying fields) 
or the bush rather than in camps or major towns in Côte d’Ivoire. 
 Yet even up to May 2011, UN and NGO activities focused on the major towns 
of Danané, Duékoué, Guiglo and Man; with the notable exception of Duékoué, 
where the International Organization for Migration hosted up to 28,000 IDPs, no 
more than a few thousand IDPs were present in any of these sites. The UN itself 
estimated in mid-May 2011 that they had registered 137,004 IDPs in the west, some 
44,466 in spontaneous sites and 92,538 in host families that would be targeted for 
assistance and monitoring in these major towns, along with Bin-Houyé and Zouan-
Hounien close to the border. Yet ‘as in Abidjan [it was assumed] that the identified 
IDPs in western Côte d’Ivoire are only a fraction of the actual number of people 
displaced’ (OCHA, 2011b).
 After 11 April, UN personnel was evacuated from Abidjan and other locations to 
Bouaké, Dakar and Man. UN coordination meetings continued in Man, but UN 
staff members were unable to travel freely in the west at least until the end of May 
2011.13 Many NGOs also followed UN security rules, restricting movements closer 
to the border. While ongoing development approaches in Côte d’Ivoire did not block 
emergency interventions at a systemic level, two key aid NGOs revealed to MSF that 
internal tensions between emergency and development wings of their organisa-
tions had led to a stalemate, such that no emergency project had been implemented 
in the zone closer to the border. Similarly, while the UN appeal was still under-
funded at 21% at end of June 2011, other available funding remained unused, with 
one key donor explaining that few NGO implementing partners could be found with 
the will or capacity to respond to the emergency in this zone. 
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 As in Liberia, no major health or humanitarian catastrophe resulted from the absence 
of a more intensive humanitarian intervention in the west. However, it must be noted 
that the region along the border—both the north–south axis between Zouan-
Hounien and Toulepleu and the more volatile west–east axis of Toulepleu–Blolequin—
saw no permanent UN or NGO presence other than MSF and the International 
Committee of the Red Cross from week 13 (28 March) until the end of May. Even 
in the more stable regions, the first inter-agency assessment in the region of Zouan-
Hounien took place in week 25—12 weeks after MSF had established permanent 
international presence in that region and more than half a year after the initial crisis. 
Meanwhile, Ivorian health staff had returned to work in places where no interna-
tional actors were yet present, such as Bin-Houyé, where one doctor and two nurses 
were present by mid-May 2011. 
 At the time, the west–east axis remained fragile, with 17–25% of patients who 
came to MSF consultations in this region residing in the bush between weeks 19 
and 21. In informal inquiries in ten villages in the health zones around Toulepleu, 
MSF teams found in July 2011 that 97 people had died of violence at the outset of 
the crisis, 55 people had died of illness or trauma during displacement, when they 
had no access to care, and 55 people had died upon return to their villages.14 This 
data suggests there were three separate waves of mortality. The first coincided with 
the peak of violence in March 2011, the second occurred in the weeks and months 
during which people lived as IDPs with host families, in campements or in the bush, 
and a third wave struck upon return to the villages, as returnees had little to no 
dependable humanitarian assistance or health care accessible to them. 
 As of August 2011, returns were not yet complete but the NGO presence was 
finally growing, more than nine months after the crisis had begun. Since the humani-
tarian presence from March 2011 onward was so starkly limited, the mortality suffered 
during these months of displacement was probably avoidable.
Access to health care in the Ivorian crisis
The crisis in Côte d’Ivoire reveals not only the challenge of responding to a sudden-
onset emergency in a developed country, but also the way in which crises that are con-
nected to violence and displacement raise questions about access to medical care. 
During and immediately following emergencies, health services face gaps in staff 
and medical supplies, while populations rendered vulnerable by crises may confront 
increased geographical or financial barriers to health care. As governments have 
done in other recent crises—such as the Haiti earthquake of 2010—the national gov-
ernment of Côte d’Ivoire implemented a countrywide policy of free health care from 
16 April to 31 May 2011, based on the exceptional situation that Ivorians experi-
enced in the aftermath of the post-electoral crisis (Government of Côte d’Ivoire, 
2012). In June, this policy was extended until further notice, pending evaluations 
by the relevant actors. 
 In contrast, Liberia had maintained a blanket free-care policy since 2007, recognis-
ing continued vulnerability even after the end of the conflict in 2002; the government 
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committed to deliver to its citizens, free of charge, a basic package of health services, 
including communicable disease control, emergency care, maternal and newborn 
health and mental health care (Downie, 2012). MSF has long documented the posi-
tive impact of free health care on access to medical care in Côte d’Ivoire,15 Liberia 
and elsewhere (MSF, 2007a; 2008; 2009b; Ponsar et al., 2011).
 A number of aid NGOs and donors raised the issue of free care and its implications 
for the need of concrete support after the recent crisis16—a development paralleling 
similar discussions following the earthquake in Haiti.17 Many key health and aid actors, 
including donors, have now acknowledged the necessity of maintaining a free health 
care policy, above all in emergencies and their immediate aftermath, when popula-
tions remain highly exposed to disease and generally precarious living conditions, 
while health structures are fragile (ECHO, 2009; IASC Global Health Cluster, 2010; 
Pearson, 2004). Accordingly, donors also recognise the long-term impact of con-
flict and violence, in terms of impoverishment, displacement, increased morbidity 
and diminished access to health care or other basic services (World Bank, 2011). 
 The recognition of continued vulnerability in post-conflict and transition con-
texts, as well as vulnerability within development contexts, has opened a wider debate 
on free care measures in these settings (Witter, 2009).18 Based on recent experiences 
in emergencies, and the increasingly receptive policy environment for free care, 
this study argues not only that humanitarian actors should reinforce capacities to 
‘change tracks’ so as to ensure adequate emergency responses where they are needed, 
but also that they should actively raise the issue of access to medical care in such con-
texts as part of their role as humanitarians. Conflicts with widespread displacement, 
violence and loss of coping mechanisms—as in Côte d’Ivoire—leave populations 
facing continued, if not increased vulnerability in the longer term. The result is a 
greater onus on humanitarian actors to push international and national actors to 
reconsider paying for health services and to prolong the suspension of user fees, until 
it can be shown that such a suspension would not risk peoples’ lives and health.
Dilemmas and debates
The limited emergency interventions in Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire point to the many 
obstacles and constraints for humanitarian aid and refugee responses in otherwise 
stable or ‘post-conflict’ settings. Emergency responses are particularly difficult to 
launch in contexts where aid has entered a mode of transition or development. 
Operationally and politically, going ‘backward’ to prepare and respond to renewed 
emergencies remains a challenge. In Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire, as elsewhere, humani-
tarian agencies may be phasing out or turning to longer-term projects; political 
sensitivities may surround contingency planning in a context where a high level of 
investment in state-building is underway; refugees or IDPs may raise security and 
stability concerns; and health system or other development gains may be perceived as 
being disturbed by humanitarian presence. 
Katharine Derderian 682 
 The emergence of emergencies in connection with forced migration in stable set-
tings is not exceptional. Such situations arose recently in the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo and in South Sudan, and in relation to sub-Saharan African refugees 
and migrants displaced within and from Libya to neighbouring countries and south-
ern Europe. 
 Several key dilemmas arise:
• Emergency response can be delayed or blocked by government, donors or develop-
ment actors that privilege development or stabilisation projects. This is especially 
the case wherever there are security or other concerns about moving populations 
and the immediate response to their needs is seen as endangering state stability, 
aid sustainability or investment in chosen systems, such as the health sector.
• Despite the existence of clear mandates for refugee assistance and protection, 
timely, effective refugee response faces particular challenges when UNHCR and 
humanitarian agencies are being drawn down in post-conflict, development or 
stabilisation contexts.
• Despite a growing body of best practices, there is continued need for debate on 
strategies to assist refugees and other moving populations in open settings.19 Aid 
actors have learned not to discriminate in aid response between refugee and host 
populations sharing resources, nor to influence decisions of refugees’ choice of 
where to seek shelter, for operational or other convenience. While experience-
based standards in refugee assistance are key, in particular distance of camps from 
international borders, the voluntariness of refugee choices must remain non-
negotiable. Today, humanitarian and health activities in response to refugees, IDPs 
and their host communities in open settings continue to struggle to apply lessons 
learnt in practice in a meaningful way—and to provide equitable quality and 
access to assistance and services, including the recognition of the impact of user 
fees on access.
• Finally, security constraints and institutional tensions between the emergency and 
development wings of the same NGOs must be acknowledged and better studied 
in view of the fact that they influence choices in humanitarian action and may 
lead to a failure to intervene.
Conclusions and the way forward
The year 2011 saw some of the largest refugee outfluxes in a decade (UNHCR, 
2011b), as well as the re-emergence of large-scale refugee interventions in new 
camp-based settings, including in Liberia, Libya, South Sudan and the Sahel. Given 
how the aid landscape and debates have evolved in the past decade, humanitarian 
debates around policy and practice must urgently catch up with field realities, in par-
ticular for refugee response.
 Today’s operational environment features influxes of refugees, asylum-seekers and 
migrants, often in mixed flows, to stable or post-conflict settings (Baouab et al., 2012). 
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In such contexts, aid faces the challenge of changing tracks to respond to sudden-
onset emergencies, even as the humanitarian aid sector encounters ever more prom-
inent stabilisation and state-building activities that may represent a challenge for 
emergency response. The need for flexibility and responsiveness applies where humani-
tarian action is left to substitute for political engagement in crises, and where humanitar-
ian action risks being compromised or co-opted in a search for policy coherence, or 
by competing political and security objectives (Collinson, Elhawary and Muggah, 
2010). The concrete impact for refugee (and migration) interventions—in camps, 
open settings and transit locations—needs to be analysed more closely, and advocated 
on, as has been the case for contexts of high insecurity and limited access.
 In several settings where refugee crises emerged in 2011–12, there was little to no 
humanitarian presence on the ground (Libya), development approaches predomi-
nated (Sahel), a drawdown of humanitarian aid was underway (Liberia) or an overall 
lack of emergency response capacity was long known to be the case (South Sudan) 
(MSF, 2009a). The debate on how to respond to unforeseen or sudden-onset refugee 
crises is long overdue, especially with regard to areas where emergency response 
capacity is limited and facing competing political and development priorities, chal-
lenges now firmly recognised within the field. Moreover, aid actors themselves must 
also scrutinise their own competing priorities and be vigilant about contexts in 
which long-term goals risk overriding responsiveness to immediate, urgent needs 
of newly arriving refugees.
 Considering the extensive body of law, policy and operational best practice already 
gathered through refugee interventions, more attention could be devoted to putting 
these lessons into practice as well as to updating the approaches to these latest chal-
lenges, including open settings and situations where moving populations arrive in 
stable or stabilisation settings. What leverage can emergency responses for refugees 
draw from existing mandates, best practices and government commitments that could 
enable a timelier, more effective response in refugee crises under some of the above-
mentioned constraints?
 The good news is that while emergency refugee responses must adjust to new 
environments, aid actors are also presented with new opportunities. Whereas stable, 
development-oriented settings have thwarted emergency humanitarian responses 
to violence and displacement in Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire, this case study suggests 
that humanitarian actors might take on an additional role and responsibility in the 
aftermath of crises. Indeed, they should take the opportunity to push for recognition 
of the continued vulnerability of violence-affected populations and to pave the way 
towards longer-term access to health care through the suspension of user fees. 
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Endnotes
1 As Levine (2011) points out: ‘The humanitarian system is geared to responding to the wrong sig-
nals, and is systemically incapable of responding adequately and on time. These problems have been 
well analysed and there is no excuse for these inadequacies to be revealed yet again. We know 
that we need longer-term strategies, backed by programmes with flexible funding that can change track 
as situations change’ (emphasis added).
2 Launched in mid-January and mid-March 2011, respectively, MSF activities along the border 
between Nimba county in Liberia and Moyen-Cavally in Côte d’Ivoire took similar approaches 
of adaptable mobile clinics that ‘followed’ the most vulnerable displaced. In Liberia, the clinics 
stopped in villages with higher concentrations of refugees; in Côte d’Ivoire, they worked along 
the north–south (Zouan-Hounien–Bin-Houyé–Toulepleu) and west–east (Toulepleu–Blolequin) 
axes. As of May 2011, 20 mobile clinics in Liberia and 25 in Côte d’Ivoire were operating along 
the border.
3 A comparison can be drawn with the situation in 2009 in Southern Sudan, where donor focus on 
post-conflict and development approaches to aid led to diminished preparedness and capacity in 
the face of foreseeable emergencies (MSF, 2009a). 
4 Internal statistics used in the planning of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
for mid-May 2011. Despite individual and rapid registration, followed by a verification exercise, 
no official figures were available for the refugees in Nimba county as of late May 2011.
5 Referring to the aid response to refugees along the border, one UN staff member told MSF in 
May 2011: ‘We cannot risk the destabilisation of Liberia considering it is still very fragile.’ A 
similar sentiment was widely expressed in the media and by UNHCR head António Guterres 
during his visit to the region in March 2011: ‘Guterres and other senior UN officials warned this 
week in Monrovia that escalating fighting and massive population displacement in neighboring 
Côte d’Ivoire threatens Liberia’s own fragile eight-year peace’ (UNHCR, 2011d).
  Similarly, a UNHCR real-time evaluation mentions issues of security and stabilisation, up-
coming elections and political aspects of aid in the region—and how balancing between the need 
for refugee response and protection had to be weighed against other political concerns: ‘The 
response was also shaped by the institutional architecture of the UN presence in Liberia, struc-
tured around the presence of an integrated peacekeeping mission and a “Delivering as One” 
model, which aims to draw on the technical capacities of individual agencies in pursuit of common 
objectives. The refugee emergency was regarded as politically significant, coming in an election 
year and amid concerns that a major conflict in Côte d’Ivoire might have a destabilising effect in 
Liberia. [. . .]
  ‘This presented particular challenges for UNHCR in determining how to assert and deliver its 
leadership role in relation to the refugee response, in line with its mandate for international refu-
gee protection, whilst working collaboratively with its partners and drawing effectively on their 
respective capacities. The fact that the vast majority of refugees were located in host communi-
ties, rather than camps, underscored the need for effective collaboration. [. . .] 
  ‘Managing these coordination challenges drew key resources away from the field-level response 
at a critical moment in the crisis’ (UNHCR, 2011a, pp. 3–4).
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6 The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs cites generally poor indicators for 
health in Liberia, including 100/1,000 infant mortality, 145/1,000 under-five mortality and 
1,200/100,000 maternal mortality rates, 24% underweight and 39% stunting among under-fives 
and 36% of people with no access to improved water sources. At the same time, Liberia is ranked 
at 162/169 on the Human Development Index and 83.7% of the population lives below the poverty 
line (OCHA, 2011a, p. iv).
7 As the internal evaluation of UNHCR’s response concedes: ‘UNHCR’s initial response to the 
crisis was hesitant. The emergency unfolded in a region where there had been significant progress 
in resolving the conflict and associated displacement crises of the previous decade, and in common 
with other humanitarian agencies, UNHCR’s field presence had been very significantly reduced. 
This, combined with the fact that this was a “slow-burning” crisis, the dimensions of which were 
not immediately evident, contributed (in the case of Liberia) to a delay in identifying and deploy-
ing additional resources, especially staff ’ (UNHCR, 2011a, p. 3).
8 The Liberian government and UNHCR had reached a consensus that the refugees would have 
to move to camps or identified host communities at a distance from the border, a policy estab-
lished in the Liberia Emergency Humanitarian Action Plan: ‘A dual strategy will be implemented. 
It will allow refugees wishing to remain in communities that can absorb them to do so, provided 
that they are located a reasonable distance from the border. They will benefit from community-
based assistance. Other refugees will be transferred to the site recently granted by the Government 
in Bahn, near the town of Saclepea, and in other camps to be identified should the influx of Ivoirian 
refugees continue’ (OCHA, 2011, p. 6).
  This policy reflects regular international practice, as stipulated in UNHCR’s Handbook for 
Emergencies: ‘to ensure the security and protection of refugees, it is recommended that they be settled 
at a reasonable distance from international borders as well as other potentially sensitive areas such 
as military installations’ (UNHCR, 2007, ch. 12, para. 35). That distance is usually at least 50 km 
from the border. Similarly, the Organization of African Unity states that: ‘For reasons of secu-
rity, countries of asylum shall, as far as possible, settle refugees at a reasonable distance from the 
frontier of their country of origin’ (OAU, 1969, para. II.6). As noted in UNHCR (2007), excep-
tions to this rule should take into account whether the interest of the refugees is better served and 
whether security and protection allow a presence closer to the border.
9 Based on an assessment in 14 locations along the border, Save the Children (2011a) shows that 
refugees chose to remain in border areas although they knew they might be deprived of assistance 
as a result. The assessment points to the ways in which international disengagement at the border 
blocked their own ability to assist: ‘[I]n recent weeks, [Save the Children] has become concerned 
that, regardless of continuing optimism in some circles that refugees would move from the border 
to officially designated locations, there has been no indication, despite information campaigns 
and substantially reduced potential for support and assistance in comparison with refugees in Bahn 
Refugee Camp, the majority of refugees would agree to move from their first choices of refuge. 
Such a situation, if prolonged, would mean that Save the Children was responding only to a small 
percentage of refugee children and would, in effect, exclude those children located in border 
communities from their rights to education and limit our ability to protect vulnerable minors’ 
(Save the Children, 2011a).
10 As IRIN (2011) reports: ‘[The] 135 protection monitors [. . .] deliver messages to refugees in vil-
lages encouraging them to move to the Bahn refugee camp. [. . .] mobile teams of legal advisers [. . .] assist 
refugees in matters of the law, such as how to get a death certificate, legalize a land claim, or inform 
them of their rights in other situations’ (emphasis added).
11 For example, Kaylay village in Nimba county saw the arrival of some 2,500 Ivorian refugees by the 
end of February. Yet according to refugees and local authorities, no food distribution had reached 
them despite registration in late May. Information given to the refugees was that no distributions 
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would be held outside the camp; subsequently, some refugees moved to the camp or to other vil-
lages, leaving 1,013 people in mid-September 2011 with no food assistance.
12 The unfinished policy states: ‘In all three counties [of Liberia—Nimba, Grand Gedeh and River 
Gee] efforts should be made to assist populations where they reside taking into consideration needs, 
security and accessibility. The assistance provided should cover all sectors (Protection including 
Child Protection, Food, Health and Nutrition; WASH, Education, Livelihoods) with a specific 
emphasis on community based services within the framework of national polices and the EHAP 
[Emergency Humanitarian Action Plan]. Maintaining adequate standards in all locations (over 100) 
where refugees reside will however be a major challenge in view of the limited access to basic 
services by local populations prior to the arrival of refugees. Assistance will therefore need to be 
prioritized’ (UNHCR, 2011c).
13 In the border areas, UN staff movements were accompanied by armed escorts of the UN Operation 
in Côte d’Ivoire, which, by mid-May 2011, were patrolling jointly with now-president Alassane 
Ouattara’s Forces Républicaines de la Côte d’Ivoire—one of the belligerents in the zone.
14 The population of these ten villages—including Bakoubly, Diai, Méo, Nézobly, Péhé and Tiobly—
stood at 21,106 before the crisis and at 11,981 as of July 2011, according to local authorities. These 
mortality numbers are clearly informal and incomplete, as the population has not yet returned, 
but they are indicative of the impact of the diminished or absent access to health care in the area from 
March 2011 onward.
15 Based on a four-year intervention, from 2003 to 2007, in the Centre Hospitalier Régional (CHR) 
Man in Côte d’Ivoire, MSF teams documented how the suspension of user fees increased the acces-
sibility of health care. The resulting MSF study finds that:
• 67.5% of households in Man displayed some criteria of vulnerability, such as displacement or 
households headed by women or minors;
• 90% of households lived under the international poverty line of $1 per person per day, with an 
average daily income of $0.27 per person;
• 41.1% of households reported being in debt, with half of these having incurred debt due to 
medical expenses; and 
• hospitalisation would cost the average patient 38 days of income, treatment for severe malaria 
would cost more than two months’ income and a caesarean section would cost about eight 
months’ income. 
  In contrast to earlier years in which user fees were in place (1999–2000), the number of overall 
consultations increased constantly from 2003 onward, once user fees were abolished, with a doubling 
of new cases in 2003–05. Similarly, bed occupancy in CHR Man rose from 51–52% in 1999–2000 
to 95% by 2006. About 40% of patients interviewed in June 2007 said they sought care in the CHR 
Man because the care was free or because of the lack of other affordable options. In June 2008, 
one year after MSF left the CHR Man and user fees were re-introduced, the impact of the policy 
change was unmistakable. Overall utilisation of services had dropped by 60%, with 66% fewer 
outpatient consultations and 75% fewer surgical operations (MSF, 2007a). 
16 International NGOs and the government have discussed this issue; see, for example, AIP (2011) 
and Save the Children (2011b). Yet they have also debated more widely, with justifiable questions, 
less about free care itself than about its implementation at the national level (Doumbia, 2011; 
Connectionivoirienne.net, 2011).
17 See, for example, MSF (2010; 2013).
18 See also MSF (2005).
19 See Koscalova, Lucchi and Kampmüller (2010); Leaning, Spiegel and Crisp (2011); Maystadt and 
Verwimp (2010); Michael, Pearson and Daliam (2006); Orach and De Brouwere (2004; 2006); 
and Van Damme et al. (1998).
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